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EQUAL PROTECTION
the court's purpose to enable plaintiffs to receive in kind goods
and services and full cash allowances." 7 0
There seems to be no conflict between applicable state and
federal laws on any of Crawford's claims. Both state and federal
precedent have adhered to those principles utilized by the
Appellate Division, First Department in Crmaford. The United
States Supreme Court has consistently held that those
classifications based on wealth are not suspect, and as such, state
legislation is subject to mere rational basis scrutiny. 7 1 The
analysis by the Crawford court suggests that New York case law
is consistent with the federal holdings.
SECOND DEPARTMENT
Carey v. Cuomo 72
(decided November 21, 1994)
Plaintiff, a county court judge, alleged that the mandatory
retirement provisions of the New York State Constitution had
violated his federal right to equal protection of the law. 73 The
Appellate Division, Second Department held that Article VI,
70. Id. at 205 A.D.2d at 308, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 575 (quoting Thrower, 138
Misc. 2d at 178, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 937).
71. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In Harris, the Court
rejected an equal protection challenge to a federal statute which prohibited
federal-funds for abortions, despite its acknowledged impact on the indigent.
In addressing that impact, the Court stated "that [this] fact does not itself
render the funding restriction constitutionally invalid, for this court has held
repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect class." Id. at 322. See
also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988). The Court, in
answering an indigent's equal protection challenge to a school bus fee stated:
"We have previously rejected the suggestion that statutes having different
effects on the wealthy and the poor should on that account alone be subjected
to strict scrutiny." Id. at 455.
72. 619 N.Y.S.2d 646 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994).
73. Id.
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section 25(b) of the New York State Constitution,74 and the
Judiciary Law section 2375 and section 11576 should not be
interpreted as extending the opportunity for post-retirement
service to those other than judges on the court of appeals or
justices of the United States Supreme Court.77 The court
specifically held that the challenged provisions did not deprive
the plaintiff, a county court judge, of equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 78
74. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 25(b). Article VI, § 25(b) provides in
pertinent part:
Each judge of the court of appeals, justice of the supreme court, judge
of the court of claims, judge of the county court... shall retire on the
last day of December in the year in which he reaches the age of seventy.
Each such former judge of the court of appeals and justice of the
supreme court may thereafter perform the duties of a justice of the
supreme court, with power to hear and determine actions and
proceedings, provided, however, that it shall be certificated in the
manner provided by law that the services of sich judge or justice are
necessary to expedite the business of the court and that he is mentally
and physically able and competent to perform the full duties of such
office. Any such certification shall be valid for a term of two years and
mnay be extended as provided by law for additional terms of two years.
A retired judge or justice shall serve no longer than until the last day of
December in the year in which he reaches the age of seventy-six.
Id.
75. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 23 (McKinney 1983). Section 23 provides in
pertinent part:
No person shall hold the office of judge, justice or surrogate of any
court, whether of record or not of record, except a justice of the peace
of a town or police justice of a village, longer than until and including
the last day of December next after he shall be seventy years of age.
Id.
76. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 115 (McKinney 1983). Section 115 provides in
relevant part: "Any justice of the Supreme Court retired pursuant to
subdivision b of section 25 of article 6 of the constitution, may, upon
application be certified by the administration board for services as a retired
justice of the Supreme Court." Id.
77. Carey, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
78. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides in pertinent part:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of 6itizens of the United States; nor shall any
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The plaintiff, John Carey, is a county court judge in
Westchester County.79 Judge Carey turned seventy on June 11th,
1994.80 The plaintiff filed requests with the Administrative Board
of the Courts of the State of New York to be considered for post-
retirement age service, but these requests were denied. 81 The
plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York and claimed that the denial of
continued service as a judge denied him equal protection of the
law. 82 The district court advised that plaintiff should seek relief
from the courts of New York, and the parties filed an action in
state court on submitted facts. 83
The court concluded, in a cursory fashion, that the plain
language of the provisions at issue limited the opportunity for
post-retirement age service to justices of the supreme court or
judges of the court of appeals. 84 The court noted that it is a well
settled principle of statutory interpretation that "where statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, a court should construe it so
as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used," 85 in
accordance with "its express terms and without resort to further
statutory construction." 86 The court ultimately rejected the
plaintiff's claim that denial of his request to continue to serve as a
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Id.
79. Carey, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. For this proposition, the court cited State v. Ford Motor Co., 74
N.Y.2d 495, 500, 548 N.E.2d 906, 908, 549 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (1989)
("Our cardinal function in interpreting a statute should be to attempt to
effectuate the intent of the Legislature, and where the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give effect to the
plain meaning of the words used.") (citations omitted).
86. Carey, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 646 (citing Podolsky v. Narnoc Corp., 196
A.D.2d 593, 595, 601 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (2d Dep't 1993)).
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judge constituted an equal protection violation. 87 Citing Maresca
v. Cuomo,88 discussed below, the court effectively stated that it
would be applying a "mere rationality" standard of review to the
plaintiffs claim. 89  The Carey court concluded that the
"complexity of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, provides a
rational basis to require greater experience and manpower than
are necessary in other courts." 90
Maresca involved a claim with substantially similar facts. 9 1 In
that case, the court of appeals held that the mandatory retirement
provisions at issue in Carey did not violate either the Equal
Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause under the United
States Constitution. 92 The Maresca court, citing Vance v.
Bradley93 and Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,94
found that judges were not a suspect class and that the statutory
age restrictions did not interfere with the exercise of a
fundamental right.95 Therefore, the provisions were subjected to
87. Id. at 647.
88. 64 N.Y.2d 242, 475 N.E.2d 95, 485 N.Y.S.2d 724 (1984).
89. Carey, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
90. Id.
91. The plaintiffs, civil court judges in New York County, sought a
declaration that the mandatory retirement age of seventy denied them both
equal protection and due process of law. Maresca, 64 N.Y.2d at 247, 475
N.E.2d at 96, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 725. The court rejected their claim, however,
holding that neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Due Process Clause
was violated by the mandatory retirement provisions directed at judges over
the age of seventy. Id. at 253, 475 N.E.2d at 100, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 729.
92. Id.
93. 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (upholding provisions for mandatory
retirement of foreign service personnel at age sixty against an equal protection
challenge, reasoning that plaintiffs claim did not involve a suspect class and
the dismissal did not abridge a fundamental right).
94. 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976). Murgia, a Massachusetts state police
officer who retired on his 50th birthday, challenged a provision for mandatory
retirement. Id. at 309. The court found that government employment was not a
fundamental right and that the age classification asserted by the officer was not
a "discrete and insular" group. Id. at 313. Applying the extremely deferential
rational basis test, the Court concluded that the provision for mandatory
retirement at age 50 did not deny equal protection to the officer. Id. at 317.
95. Maresca, 64 N.Y.2d at 250, 475 N.E.2d at 98, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
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the extremely deferential rational basis test.96 In other words, the
applicable test asks whether the government classification has
some rational relation to conceivable and legitimate state
interests. 97
The Maresca court hypothesized seven possible objectives for
the classification at issue which it deemed rationally related to
legitimate state interests:
(1) advancement of general considerations of judicial efficiency;
(2) motivation and encouragement of younger attorneys with
judicial aspirations by this orderly process of attrition; (3)
elimination of the unpleasantness and embarrassment of
selectively removing aged and disabled Judges; (4) prevention of
harm by a few disabled Judges which more than offsets loss of
Judges who retain their full powers past age 70; (5) elimination
of the administrative burden of testing each Judge age 70 to
assess competency; (6) avoidance of the economic burden of
testing and removing incapable Judges; and (7) the fixing of a
line at a certain age which attempts to uphold the high
competency for judicial posts and which fulfills societal demand
for the highest caliber Judges in the system.98
The court in Maresca concluded its decision by stating:
It is not within the province of the judiciary to balance the
advisability of a lawfully implemented public policy against the
hardship or illogic it may be said to impose. This is especially
true in the instant case where the policy at issue, expressed in a
constitutional provision, directly manifests the will of the
electorate of the State of New York. Inasmuch as the distinctions
embodied in the challenged provisions can be justified as shown
above, plaintiff's constitutional challenge must fail. 9 9
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 251, 475 N.E.2d at 99, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 728.
99. Id. at 251, 475 N.E.2d at 100, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 729. In addition to
holding that the retirement provisions did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, the court in Carey noted other distinctions between lower court judges,
judges on the court of appeals, and justices of the supreme court regarding
terms of office and qualifications. Carey, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 647. The term of
office for a county court judge is ten years, N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 10(b),
while that of a supreme court justice is fourteen years. N.Y. CONST. art VI,
19951
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The extensive discussion of a substantially similar issue in
Maresca allowed the Appellate Division, Second Department in
Carey to issue a brief decision based upon the court of appeals'
decision.
In conclusion, the mandatory retirement provisions of the New
York Constitution and the Judiciary Law do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause with respect to judges other than supreme court
justices or judges on the court of appeals.
Chasalow v. Board of AssessorslO
(decided March 14, 1994)
The petitioners, a group of Nassau County taxpayers, brought
suit claiming that the Nassau County Board of Assessors violated
the Equal Protection Clauses of both the State101 and Federal 102
Constitutions, by employing a cost method in its assessment of
class I residential properties which caused "gross disparities in
the tax burden imposed upon similarly-situated taxpayers." ' 103
The Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the
petitioner's constitutional rights had not been violated. 104 The
§ 6(c). Judges on the court of appeals and justices of the supreme court are
required to have been admitted to practice law in the State of New York for at
least ten years while other judges are required to have been admitted to
practice law for only five years. N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 20(a). Finally, the
court in Carey concluded by plainly stating the fact that the plaintiff had
occasionally served as a supreme court justice was irrelevant to his position.
Carey, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 647.
100. 202 A.D.2d 499, 609 N.Y.S.2d 27 (2d Dep't 1994).
101. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Article I, § 11 provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states in
pertinent part: "No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Id.
103. Chasalow, 202 A.D.2d at 500, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
104. Id. at 499, 609 N.Y.S.2d at 28. In this decision, the appellate division
reversed the Nassau County Supreme Court holding that the method utilized by
the county to "assess Class I residential property" was unconstitutional and
illegal. Id.
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